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We investigate the extent to which the investment slowdown in many Asian countries 
since the Asian Financial Crisis is attributable to changes in governance institutions. 
In the process we test the more general hypothesis that different aspects of governance 
will become relevant constraints to investment and growth at differing levels of 
countries‟ development. This hypothesis is validated and explains a standing paradox 
that finds certain governance aspects – notably voice and accountability and control of 
corruption – do not apparently figure as explanations in the average growth record. 
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From one viewpoint, it appears misplaced to even pose the question of raising investment 
and growth in Asia. In the midst of the recent Great Recession it has, after all, been mostly 
countries in Asia that have manifested the greatest resilience and maintained 
comparatively high investment ratios. All this is relative, however, and when viewed in 
relation to the Asian financial crisis, investment ratios in Asia may be observed to have 
declined. 
 
Table 1 shows this decline has been most pronounced in East Asia, where the average 
investment ratio fell from 30 percent in the five-year period immediately preceding the 
Asian financial crisis (1992-1996), to 24 percent in the succeeding period (2002-2006) and 
before the Global Recession hit. Declines were particularly marked in countries that were 
severely affected by the Asian financial crisis (e.g., Indonesia, Korea, Thailand, Malaysia 
Singapore, and the Philippines). A decline on average is also notable in Central Asia (from 
25 to 21 percent of GDP). By contrast, South Asian countries as a group appear to have 
been less affected; in fact the average investment ratio even rose slightly between the two 
periods. Levels for Oceania (i.e., for countries where comparable data are available) on the 
other hand, have been more or less constant between the two periods. 
 
Notwithstanding such broad generalisations, there are notable exceptions: investment 
ratios have continued to rise in China, Vietnam, and Mongolia, for example, despite the 
general decline for the sub-region, while Pakistan and Sri Lanka are exceptions in a region 
where investment activity has generally increased since the Asian crisis.  
 
This paper seeks to explain whether considerations of institutions and governance can 
shed any additional light on this pattern. We examine global patterns, but special attention 
will be paid to the Asia and the countries that are the specific focus of this volume, namely 
China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and Vietnam.  
 
Complications and qualifications 
 
Any attempt to draw broad generalisations regarding the post-Asian crisis investment-
decline will immediately be fraught with difficulties and qualifications. Asian economies 
are themselves extremely heterogeneous in terms of their investment record, levels of 
income, and past growth performance – as well as the institutions surrounding their 
economic performance. Even the most basic growth theories will suggest that an 
economy‟s level of maturity, as captured, say by income per capita, will affect its rate of 
                                                 
1 Draft chapter in Sustaining Asia’s growth and investment in a changing world, a forthcoming volume 
edited by Hal Hill and Ma. Socorro Gochoco-Bautista. 
2 School of Economics, University of the Philippines. We are grateful to Juzhong Zhuang, John V.C. Nye, 
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investment
3, and the wide differences in investment-outcomes have already been noted in 
the previous section. Such growth potentials and trajectories will also obviously differ 
depending on resource-endowments, size of internal markets, and so on. 
 
Table 1. Investment ratios 
(averages for 1992-1996 and 2002-2006; selected Asian countries) 
Subregion and Country  1992-1996  2002-2006 
   East Asia  30.1  24.1* 
*Brunei Darussalam  31.9  14.3 
Cambodia  12.0  18.4 
China  34.7  39.3 
*Hong Kong, China  28.8  22.2 
*Indonesia  27.5  21.5 
*Korea, Rep.  36.9  28.9 
Lao PDR  n.a.   29.6 
Macao, China  30.0  18.8 
*Malaysia  40.4  22.2 
Mongolia  25.5  28.5 
*Philippines  22.8  16.2 
*Singapore  35.6  24.3 
*Thailand  40.2  25.9 
Vietnam  25.3  32.2 
   South Asia**  26.0     28.5 
Afghanistan  n.a.  21.9 
Bangladesh  18.6  23.8 
Bhutan  45.6  56.0 
India  22.7  27.4 
Maldives  31.0  33.9 
Nepal  21.2  19.9 
Pakistan  18.1  16.5 
Sri Lanka  25.0  22.2 
   Central Asia  25.1  20.7 
Kazakhstan  24.9  25.7 
Kyrgyz Republic  16.7  16.6 
Tajikistan  16.2  12.0 
Turkmenistan  38.1  26.1 
Uzbekistan  29.5  23.1 
   Oceania***  18.4  18.8 
Fiji  15.1  18.4 
Papua New Guinea  19.1  18.8 
Solomon Islands   n.a.  9.4 
Tonga  18.1  17.3 
Vanuatu  21.3  20.8 
*countries severely affected by the Asian financial crisis;  
**excludes Afghanistan for comparability; ***excludes Solomon Islands for comparability 
 
Beyond this, however, the nature of the investing actors themselves will differ across 
countries, as therefore will the factors (both narrowly economic and financial as well as 
institutional) that influence them. Important distinctions can be made between relatively 
open and closed investment regimes, as well as between those where the public sector 
plays a large role in financial and industrial-policy decisions. Countries with a history of 
central planning – such as those of China and Vietnam – are an obvious case in point. 
Even exogenous shocks, for example, will not be reflected in a similar manner as between 
                                                 
3 The Solow growth model, for example, represents this as an economy‟s distance from its steady state. 4 
economies where a good amount of credit is allocated among state-owned enterprises and 
one where the private sector is largely free to make decisions.  
 
Finally, one needs to consider the lingering effects of the Asian financial crisis and the 
more recent global recession itself. Three of the countries given particular treatment in this 
volume were heavily affected by the Asian financial crisis. It is a persuasive argument that 
the Asian financial crisis itself partook of many aspects of a “balance-sheet recession”
4. 
This implies that (especially private) investment may not revive until corporate balance 
sheets have recovered from the post-recession regime of working off their debts. This in 
itself suggests an a priori reason why the investment recovery in affected countries may 
be delayed. Aside from purely economic factors, arising from the Asian financial crisis, 
political and institutional changes arising directly from or influenced by that crisis are also 
undeniable: Indonesia underwent an historic and sometimes violent political and social 
regime-shift; Thailand experimented successively (and occasionally even violently) with 
various electoral and military-supported political changes, while new opposition political 
forces waxed and waned in Malaysia. Even at a preliminary and superficial level, 
therefore, it can be easily argued that the explanation of investment ratios across countries 
is in principle “over-determined”.  
 
As for the influence of institutions themselves, an extensive literature already exists that 
generally associates institutional factors and measures of governance with economic 
performance.
5 Notwithstanding this, however, some controversy remains regarding the 
causality involved and empirical significance of the relationship. On the issue of causality, 
debate still rages as to whether good economic performance follows upon the adoption of 
“good” institutions, or whether such institutions are in fact the result of the former. As for 
significance, different empirical studies have found instances suggesting that measures of 
good institutions (or institutional outcomes) are not uniformly associated with improved 
economic performance. This may be seen even from Barro‟s earliest growth investigations 
[Barro and Sala-I-Marin 1995], which showed that measures of the rule of law and of 
political instability mattered for growth, while no strong relationship existed with other 
outcomes of ex-ante good institutions such as civil liberties, corruption, quality of the 
bureaucracy, expropriation risk, etc.  
 
Here we follow North [1990] in defining institutions as “humanly-devised constraints” on 
human behaviour. These come in two forms: formal institutions refer to codified or 
explicit constraints on action, such as constitutions, laws, and rules and regulations 
promulgated in society. On the other hand, informal institutions take the form of norms 
and customs that also regulate behaviour but are not codified (making them difficult to 
measure directly). The conceptual relationship between “institutions” and “governance” 
has not always been clear (see e.g., Zhuang, de Dios, and Lagman-Martin [2010]), but 
here we follow Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi [2003] and define governance as “the 
traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised”. In this way, 
therefore, we can conceive of governance as the result of both formal and informal 
institutions. Indirectly, therefore, the quality of institutions may be judged by governance 
outcomes.  
                                                 
4 The phrase is associated with Koo [2008], who used it to explain the Japanese recession of the 1990s. We 
owe to discussions with Felipe Medalla and Victor Valdepeñas many years ago the insight that this might 
apply to the Asian financial crisis as well. Insights along these lines were, of course, provided much earlier 
by Minsky [1975], whose ideas have enjoyed a revival since the onset of the most recent global recession. 
5 A recent survey is found in Zhuang, de Dios, and Lagman-Martin [2010]. 5 
 
This paper pursues the hypothesis that different institutions and measures of governance 
will matter to countries at different levels of development. We therefore take issue with 
the idea that all a priori desirable institutional aspects will matter and represent equally 
relevant constraints to growth. The latter idea is at least implicit in all empirical attempts 
to find relationships between measures of governance/institutional outcomes on the one 
hand and various measures of economic performance, on the other.  
 
This issue is especially relevant for Asia, given the interest (both political and academic) 
surrounding the supposed exceptionalism of Asian institutions and their role in 
development, as well as the inherent heterogeneity of the countries involved. Many years 
ago, scholars like Chang [1990] (more recently also in Chang and Lin [2009]), have 
argued that – contrary to orthodox advice and representation
6 – deliberate protection and 
industrial policy by an activist state were important factors in the rapid industrial advance 
of Korea. In a somewhat simpler form, this discussion manifested itself in the “Asian 
values” debate of the 1980s (famously associated with Malaysia‟s Mahathir and 
Singapore‟s Lee Kuan-Yew), during which some Asian leaders defended existing 
authoritarian political systems and the restriction on civil liberties as necessary 
components for a state seeking to safeguard social stability, direct industrial priorities, or 
both. This view was subsequently echoed and given an analytical scaffolding by some 
scholars (e.g., Khan and Jomo [2000]) who proposed to understand the existence of rents 
(including corruption rents) as at times (though not always) necessary concomitants of the 
social stability that allows economic development to occur. It was argued, for example, 
that Malaysia‟s patently discriminatory and at times confiscatory race-based economy 
policy was historically necessary in order to purchase the social stability that allowed 
economic development to occur [Jomo 2000]. In a similar vein, Chang [1990] has long 
argued that the privileges allowed the chaebol early in Korea‟s economic history were 
needed as an enticement for their investment in what the leadership had decided were 
strategic industries. 
 
More recently, these line of argument received support in a more general form and a 
mainstream source. In their ambitious typology of social orders, North, Wallis, and 
Weingast [2009] suggest that at a country‟s initial stages of development (i.e., in “natural” 
or slightly better “limited-access” orders) the need to control social violence is paramount 
and is typically achieved through elites reaching a modus vivendi among themselves to 
monopolise (or share) power and to extract rents. Such arrangements are fundamentally 
different from the ideal associated with the most developed Western countries (North, 
Wallis, and Weingast‟s “open-access orders”), where contestable political power and 
democracy prevail. Necessary conditions for the transition are the acceptance of the rule of 
law for elites, the existence of impersonal and long-lived social organizations, and control 
of the military. 
 
The implications of the above framework are too rich to be fully discussed here. For this 
paper‟s purposes, it is sufficient to point out some stark empirical possibilities: namely, 
the possibility that a poor country with formal institutions appearing to guarantee 
democracy and civil liberties (or even having a sophisticated bureaucracy) may still 
perform poorly in pure economic terms if it is threatened by violence and lawlessness. In 
                                                 
6 Chang and other writers were concerned to correct the representation of the East Asian Tigers‟ success as a 
triumph of fairly liberal economic policies, as asserted, e.g., by the World Bank [1990]. 6 
this case, the absence of political stability or a breakdown in the rule of law may be more 
important for investment decisions (and hence for growth) than the presence of formal 
democracy, a related point made recently by Fukuyama [2008]. This also raises the 
possibility that countries with high levels of corruption may nonetheless perform 
satisfactorily if corruption-rents are a concomitant for the (elitist) control of social 
violence. Arguments of this type may also rely on some version of the Shleifer and Vishny 
[1993] argument that decentralised (contestable and duplicative) corruption may yield 
more inefficient results than the centralised kind.
7 
 
Indeed at lower levels of development, the shape of higher (e.g., national-level) political 
arrangements may matter little, since market-exchange may be more limited to local areas 
and in scale to begin with. Whatever formal or legal difficulties are imposed on private 
contracting can typically be moderated through informal arrangements, as suggested by 
Acemoglu and Simon [2004], the latter possibly including corruption, to the extent that 
such informal arrangements do not conform or even violate the letter of formal rules. In 
such cases, local-level institutions, including norms and lower-level accountabilities, may 
provide enough workable bases for contracting at smaller scales. Possible mechanisms 
that may mediate such transactions may include informal institutions associated with 
“Confucian” values, local trust, and relational contracting (guanxi).
8 This may partly 
explain why single-party systems arising from socialist mass movements (such as those in 
China and Vietnam) can nevertheless accommodate high investment and growth over 
longer periods. Even severe restrictions on civil liberties, say, as these relate to national-
level politics and decisions, may continue to be compatible with a tradition for greater 
transactional flexibility and responsiveness with respect to local-level issues, and in this 
way, not hinder growth of a certain scale and sophistication. (See, e.g., Xu [1997] for a 
hopeful view and Thornton [2008] for a more pessimistic one on Chinese developments.) 
 
As the scale of markets widens and anonymous exchange becomes more prevalent and 
necessary, however, such small-scale arrangements may prove increasingly inadequate, 
and one can anticipate a greater need for uniformity in the application of rules and laws 
over wider geographical areas and more varied transactions. At higher levels of income 
and development, as the “threshold conditions” described by North et al. [2009] come to 
be met, the larger scale and greater variety of projects bump up against the capacity and 
interest of state apparatuses to intervene. The growing number of and differentiation 
among non-state economic actors can be expected to create a greater demand for better 
policies and regulation and a more non-discriminatory application of rules based on 
objective criteria. At this point, concerns among investors (now more numerous and 
heterogeneous) for the quality of regulation may grow and threats to investments from 
capricious decisions is bound to make corruption a more pronounced concern. In the limit, 
the inability of the status quo to make such changes may create a demand for civil liberties 
and accountability at higher national levels.  
 
In purely economic terms, another way to view the matter
9 is to imagine that at initial 
levels of development, a country operates well below its production-possibilities frontier. 
At that point, the environment will be “forgiving” of small mistakes, since movement in 
almost any direction is likely to represent some form of improvement. At higher levels of 
                                                 
7 Indeed, these authors use the Philippines‟ post-Marcos experience as a negative example.  
8 Zhuang, de Dios, and Lagman Martin [2010] noted that a number of high-performing Asian countries such 
as Vietnam and China manifested high levels of “trust” or social capital.  
9 We thank Juzhong Zhuang for this observation, which came up in earlier discussions. 7 
resource-utilisation (e.g., at points at or close to the frontier), however, information 
requirements are bound to be more stringent, investment commitments larger, and the risk 
of mistakes greater. In such conditions, not only the correctness of decisions but also their 
social legitimacy is bound to represent a constraint on investment choices. At even higher 
levels of development, when societies seek to push the frontier of possibilities outward 
rather than merely approach it, innovativeness and creativity are likely to be compatible 




Depending on its level of development, therefore, each country may face a different 
binding constraint, depending on level of development and historical circumstances. 
Governance, then, is not one thing but many; it is not a real number but a vector. 
 
If at all, however, this discussion only qualifies the instrumental value of individual 
freedoms, civil liberties, and democracy for economic performance and does not touch 
upon what Sen [1999] has termed their intrinsic and constructive values. Each society, 
however, is left to transact among its own members exactly how far and when civil 
liberties and democratic institutions should be introduced in its own development path, the 
inherent dilemma for nondemocratic regimes being how any putative “social choice” is to 
be legitimised. 
 
Tests and results 
 
To recapitulate, this paper‟s advances the simple observation that different dimensions of 
governance may matter for countries at different levels of development. At low levels of 
income and with large reserves of unused resources, binding constraints may take the form 
of government effectiveness, the rule of law, and political stability. At early stages of 
development, the more immediate deterrent to growth may the fundamental insecurity of 
investments against the threat of violence, confiscation, and seizure by contending elites. 
Ultimately, however, as per-capita incomes increase and both the scale and variety of 
potential transactions expand, other governance factors such as the controlling corruption, 
permitting voice and accountability, and providing an intelligent scheme of regulation, 
may figure more prominently for sustaining high rates of investment.  
 
Empirically, we build upon the results reported in an earlier paper by Quibria [2006], 
which failed to find a strong relationship between growth in a set of developing Asian 
countries and a constructed general measure of governance using the measures developed 
by Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (henceforth KKM). The KKM measures – which 
have since become widely used – are constructed indices of six dimensions of governance, 
namely: “voice and accountability”, “political stability”, “rule of law”, “government 
effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, and “control of corruption”.
11  Subsequently, Zhuang, 
de Dios, and Lagman-Martin [2010] decomposed this general “governance measure” into 
various components and related these separately to growth performance on a global set of 
                                                 
10 This is by no means a novel idea; the discouragement of freedom of inquiry and thought was J. S. Mill‟s 
primary apprehension regarding an hypothetical collectivist society, which he thought would be inconsistent 
with the “diversity of tastes and talents, and variety of intellectual points of view” that are “the mainspring 
of mental and moral progression” (Book 2, Chapter 1, Principles of political economy]. Knowing what we 
do now regarding the continuing importance of creativity in a knowledge-based economy, we might well 
have added “material progression” to Mill‟s list. 
11 Strictly speaking, these governance indicators cannot be aggregated, as KKM themselves have cautioned. 8 
countries and on developing Asian countries in particular. Asian countries were then 
classified according to whether they manifested a “surplus” or a “deficit” with respect to 
one or the other governance measure, depending on whether they fell above or below the 
value predicted b the global regression on income. They found that a loose enumeration of 
Asian countries‟ subsequent growth performance is more closely associated with earlier 
“governance-surpluses” (respectively, “-deficits”) with respect to “government 
effectiveness”, “regulatory quality”, and “the rule of law”. By contrast, dimensions such 
as “control of corruption”, “voice and accountability”, and “political stability” appear to 
have less predictive power. 
 
While this earlier work represents a definite advance, it still suffers from the implicit 
presumption that the same relevant governance measures potentially affects all countries 
uniformly on average: they have, if anything, only restricted, the set of variables that 
might matter on average. Left unelaborated, it may also leave the impression of an 
unwarranted Asian exceptionalism, which argues that the institutions and conditions 
required for growth in Asia are inherently different from those required elsewhere. 
 
If our hypothesis holds, however, what is really needed is an allowance for the possibility 
that different governance outcomes actually matter for countries at different levels of 
development, a fact that will be hidden by the estimation of average relationships (even 
those conditional upon per-capita income). We therefore build upon this previous 
empirical work and test the hypothesis of differentiated-governance influence by first 
partitioning the sample of countries based on their per-capita GDP in 1991-1995 then 
estimating the effect on the change in investment ratios between 1991-1995 and 2002-
2006 as these relate to changes in measures of governance that are salient to each 
country‟s level of development.  
 
Let then the sample of countries then be partitioned into mutually exclusive categories, 
say quantiles, Q1, Q2, …, QH and the various governance dimensions (e.g., voice and 
accountability, political stability, and so on) be indexed by Gi (i = 1, 2, …, 6). Each Gi  is 
then mapped into the country-categories for which we hypothesise it to be relevant. This 
then yields the set of categories Q(Gi) = {Qh, h  {1,2,…,H}| Gi is an a priori binding 
governance-constraint}. Hence for example, we may hypothesise that “voice and 
accountability” is a binding constraint only for countries in the second to the fourth 
quartile; this means Q(G1) = {Q2, Q3, Q4}. The value of governance measure i for country 
k is denoted as Gik so that its change between the two periods is Gik. We then define the 
dummy-variable, Dik  such that Dik = 1 for k  Q(Gi) and 0 otherwise. The governance 
regressors for the change in the investment is then for country k are then specified to be: 
 
  DikGik for all i, k. 
 
Denoting the change in the current investment-ratio of country k as Ak , the specification 
for the regressions therefore take the following general form: 
 
        (1) 
where the Zjk denote controls variables that include, among others: (a) the country‟s 
previous level of GDP per capita; or alternatively (b) the change in GDP per capita in the 
previous period; (c) the previous level of Aj ; (d) regional dummies. The use of GDP per 
capita as well as the change in that variable is based alternatively on the Solow model and 9 
a Keynesian accelerator. A negative coefficient is expected in the case of the Solow 
model, while a positive sign is expected if accelerator-related factors are taken into 
account.  
 
The specification in (1) is to be contrasted with the notion that governance factors are 
equally binding so that a common relationship exists that relates changes in any 
governance-variable to some change in the investment ratio, which would be written as: 
 




å  .          (2) 
A benchmark is provided by the “naïve” equation that seeks to explain the change in the 
rate of investment excluding all consideration of any institutional and governance 
variables. This is shown as Equation 1 in Table 2.1. Here, the only significant variables 
are the average investment previous period, the Asian-crisis dummy, and the Sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy, with the equation itself explaining about one-third of the variation. The 
only variable of interest to Asia here is then the Asian financial crisis. 
 
The estimated Equation 2 in Table 2.1, on the other hand, includes governance variables 
but without differentiating their saliency according to countries‟ levels of development. 
This is essentially the implementation of the average relationship (2) above. The result is 
that only two governance variables appear to matter on average: rule of law and regulatory 
quality. Upon hindsight, this is a result similar to the Barro‟s earliest findings (reported in 
Barro and Sala-I-Martin [1995]) showing the rule of law but not democratic institutions to 
be an influence on growth and investment. This also essentially reproduces the Zhuang, de 
Dios, and Martin [2010] exercise showing only factors associated with rule-of-law and 
regulatory-quality variables mattering for growth in Asia. Given the nature of the sample 
involved, however, it is evident (contrary to what may be suggested by earlier work) that 
the phenomenon is not peculiarly Asian at all but rather a global one, thus undermining 
any case for Asian exceptionalism. 
 
Our maintained hypothesis instead is that the lack of apparent influence of other 
governance variables effect is due to the failure to account for levels of development.  Our 
first attempt to test the hypothesis in (1) above is shown as Equation 3 in Table 2.1, but 
with no restrictions imposed on the applicable governance variables; rather the full set of 
variables (G1 to G6) is regressed for each income-quartile, a procedure that is tantamount 
to allowing a differential impact of governance variables within each group, conditional 
upon regional dummies. The results plainly show that different governance measures do 
matter in different ways for investment in countries in different quartiles, bolstering this 
paper‟s main hypothesis. The governance variable that proves most relevant for the 
poorest quartile (Q1) is the “rule of law”. Meanwhile, “voice and accountability” and 
“regulatory quality” are significant and of the expected sign for the second quartile; 
corruption control is significant and of the expected sign for the third quartile, while 
regulatory quality again appears significant for the richest quartile.  
 
In line with our maintained hypothesis that higher-order governance variables such as 
voice and corruption-control are less significant in the instrumental sense for poorer 
countries with large unused resources, we proceed to test more restricted sets of 
governance variables that are a priori regarded as more relevant to each quartile. Our 
favoured specifications are Equations 5 and 6, which include a dummy-variable 
identifying countries severely affected by the Asian financial crisis (which turns out to be 10 
negative and highly significant), as well as changes in openness (though insignificant). 
Equation 5 uses initial per capita GDP (i.e., its natural logarithm) and the previous change 
in investment as controls and both have negative and significant coefficients, as the 
neoclassical theory suggests. On the other hand, Equation 6 replaces the level of GDP per 
capita with the change in per-capita GDP, as accelerator models of investment suggest. 
The coefficient of that variable is positive and significant, again consistent with theory. 
 
Regional dummies for the Middle East and North Africa, Western Europe, North America, 
and Sub-Saharan Africa are also all significant with negative coefficients.
12 Initially 
puzzling but ultimately important in both Equations 5 and 6 is the perverse and significant 
coefficient of the anti-corruption variable in the first quartile, signifying that controlling 
corruption may have an adverse impact on investment for countries at that level of 
income. This is entirely consistent with the hypothesis, however. Given the pervasiveness 
and systemic nature of corruption in some of the poorest countries, significant efforts to 
combat corruption may unsettle vested interests that are already responsible for investment 
to a large degree under the existing equilibrium, so that at least initially, investment ratios 
may fall. Eliminating this variable from the set of regressors (e.g. Equation 4) leads to a 
significantly weaker performance of the equation, strongly suggesting that this effect 
cannot be ignored 
 
When corruption-control alone is regressed on changes in investment ratios conditional on 
quartiles (not displayed) it shows a negative and significant effect only for Q1 and the 
expected positive ones for Q2-Q4, although it is significant only for Q3. This suggests its 
influence in the other quartiles may be confounded by a correlation with other variables. 
 
The above results are robust in showing the rule of law to be the only variable that matters 
for countries in the poorest quartile; voice and accountability matter for the next poorest; 
the quality of regulation is significant for the second, third, and even the richest quartiles; 
while improvements in the control of corruption appear to matter in the conventional sense 
only for the third quartile. 
 
In purely statistical terms, the inclusion of governance-indicators (i.e., moving from 
Equation 1 to Equation 6 in Table 2.1) raises the explanatory power of the equation (as 
represented by the adjusted-R
2 statistic) by some 25 percent.
13  As one moves from a 
specification that relates governance indicators to investment that disregards levels of 
development to one that does (i.e., from Equation 2 to Equation 5 in Table 2.1), adjusted-
R





   
                                                 
12 The comparator is Central and South America. 
13 Note that 0.4237/0.3373 = 1.256 11 
Table 2.1. Change in gross investment ratio 
(relative to GDP; 2002-2006 versus 1991-1995) 
Variable  1  2  3  4  5  6 
Constant  20.49244  24.03978  23.78651  22.8767  21.97236    14.77054 
Ln of GDP per capita in 1991-1995  -.9053611  -1.189827  -.929884  -.9775747  -.8741706    
Change in GDP per capita in 1991-1995            .000288 
Investment ratio in 1991-1995  -.4805091  -.4881687  -.5404616  -.5021135  -.5072225   -.0851009 
Change in openness  .0214967  .020307    .0149557  .0144501  .0073649 
Asian Crisis dummy  -5.491743  -4.750761    -5.222663  -5.068646   -5.016919 
East Asia-Pacific dummy  -1.672479  -1.617621  -.4491171  -2.320848  -2.356231   -2.460095 
East Europe-C. Asia dummy   -.0482465  -.9580861  -2.387824  -2.220965  -2.038624   -2.11433 
Mid-East and N. Africa dummy  -2.702846  -3.964106  -5.163476  -4.456022  -4.357055   4.882911 
South Asia dummy  2.129973  1.110524  .2896751  .4716163  .0286864   1.334655 
Western Europe dummy  -1.304852  -3.027254  -4.704656  -4.261546  -4.274935   -7.027077 
North America dummy  -.970269  -2.579541  -3.934331  -3.877361  -3.922107   -7.002583 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  -4.037999  -5.238709  -5.821427  -5.302762  -5.219045   -3.853982 
Improvement in rule of law    2.6309         
× Q1 dummy      7.33815  5.837588  6.899314     7.153036 
× Q2 dummy      -.0652999       
× Q3 dummy      3.29519       
× Q4 dummy      -.9463313       
Improvement in control of corruption              
× Q1 dummy      -3.620919    -3.773705   -4.02394 
× Q2 dummy      -1.409573       
× Q3 dummy      3.417352  3.302339  3.262329     3.408208 
× Q4 dummy      -.1244986       
Improvement in voice/accountability             
× Q1 dummy      1.071937       
× Q2 dummy      5.698999  4.332847  4.309407     4.445405 
× Q3 dummy      -1.116899       
× Q4 dummy      4.188836       
Improvement in regulatory quality    2.604041         
× Q1 dummy      1.697484       
× Q2 dummy      3.850848  3.188051  3.062253     2.597955 
× Q3 dummy      2.889007  3.2054  3.148746     2.76828 
× Q4 dummy      2.863027  3.739467  3.699804     3.070298 
Improvement in political stability             
× Q1 dummy      -.1990111       
× Q2 dummy      -1.664573       
× Q3 dummy      -1.09184       
× Q4 dummy      .8453724       
Change in govt. effectiveness             
× Q1 dummy      .8463122       
× Q2 dummy      .8274293       
× Q3 dummy      -1.566613       
× Q4 dummy      .765996       
N  164  164  164  164  164  164 
Adjusted R2  0.3373  0.3975  0.3770  0.4104  0.4169  0.4237 
Root mean square error  6.1131  5.8289  5.9582  5.7657  5.7342  5.7003 
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Table 2.2. Change in gross domestic investment ratio 
(relative to GDP; 2002-2006 versus 1991-1995) 
Variable  5A  5B  6A  6B 
Constant  23.87549  24.1362     14.55222  15.25657 
Ln of GDP per capita in 1991-1995  -1.136733  -1.206602     
Change in GDP per capita in 1991-1995      .0002751    .0002891 
Investment ratio in 1991-1995  -.5724277  -.5729402  .6252109  -.6224128 
Change in openness  .0420954  .0418042    .0359619  .0359906    
Asian Crisis dummy  -4.9731  -4.84753  -5.070281  -5.20041 
Dependency ratio in 1991-1995    .0419469    -.074606 
Bank credit, ratio to GDP, 1992-1996    -.0006917    -.0013684 
East Asia-Pacific dummy  -1.009067  -1.029266  -.8877989  -.842667 
East Europe-C. Asia dummy   -.1251076  -.3674666  -.4555196  -.094153 
Mid-East and N. Africa dummy  -2.454569  -2.373515  2.761028  -2.868018 
South Asia dummy  1.730663  1.760633  3.178371  2.958212 
Western Europe dummy  -2.782681  -3.280329  -4.71365  -3.699297 
North America dummy  -2.099154  -2.388362  -4.499465  -3.727073 
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy  -4.002732  -3.960766  2.396525  -2.687162 
Improvement in rule of law         
× Q1 dummy  7.939351  7.123113  7.700631  7.662843 
× Q2 dummy         
× Q3 dummy         
× Q4 dummy         
Improvement in control of corruption          
× Q1 dummy  -3.89432  -3.883651  -4.317154  -4.241121 
× Q2 dummy         
× Q3 dummy  3.109323  3.006371  3.246485  3.442973 
× Q4 dummy         
Improvement in voice/accountability         
× Q1 dummy         
× Q2 dummy  5.365525  5.361836  5.412771  5.328551 
× Q3 dummy         
× Q4 dummy         
Improvement in regulatory quality         
× Q1 dummy         
× Q2 dummy  3.304738  3.284139  2.839041  2.88387 
× Q3 dummy  2.332015  2.377438  2.102299  2.066918 
× Q4 dummy  3.616511  3.812148  .5731368  .3787444 
N  156  156  156  156 
Adjusted R2  0.5458  0.5394  0.5487  0.5438 
Root mean square error  4.8852  4.9191  4.8691  4.8957 
Note: Coefficients in boldface are significant at the ten-percent level or better.  
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Accounting for demographic variables and the degree of sophistication of a country‟s 
financial system contributes little to the explanation. Table 2.2 shows specifications that 
involve past-period dependency ratios and the past-period ratio of bank credit to GDP 
(Equations 5A, 5B, 6A, and 6B), and neither proves significant. The incompleteness of 
data for these additional variables, moreover, reduces the sample size from 164 to 156 
countries, which causes a loss in the significance of regulatory quality only in the richest 
quartile, improves the showing by the openness variable, as well as an improved fit. The 
direction and significance of all other governance variables are as before. In what follows, 
therefore, we revert to estimates involving the full sample. 
 
Equations 5 and 6 in Table 2.1 involving the full sample correctly predict the change in 
investment ratios for 24 (out of 31) included developing Asian countries, with mean 
squared errors of 24 and 25.1 respectively.
14 By contrast, Equations 1 and 2 correctly 
predict 20 and 22 of these investment-ratio differences in Asia, with respective mean 
squared errors of 34.3 and 30.8.  
 
Table 3. Decomposition* of contribution to explanatory power 
(Governance variables in general versus  
governance differentiated by countries’ level of development) 
Explanatory Variable  1  2  3 
  Equation 2  Equation 5  Equation 6 
Ln of GDP per capita in 1992-1996  0.028  0.021   
Change in GDP per capita 1996-2002      -0.004 
Investment ratio in 1992-1996  0.295  0.306  0.336 
Change in openness 1996-2002  0.002  0.001  0.001 
Asian Crisis dummy  0.036  0.039  0.038 
Regional dummies  0.034  0.032  0.036 
       
Improvement in       
Rule of law (general)  0.017     
Regulatory quality (general)  0.040     
Rule of law: Q1    0.015  0.015 
Control of corruption: Q1    0.009  0.009 
Voice and accountability: Q2    0.013  0.013 
Regulatory quality: Q2    0.019  0.016 
Regulatory quality: Q3    0.007  0.006 
Control of corruption: Q3    0.015  0.016 
Regulatory quality: Q4    0.013  0.011 
     Sum governance variables  0.057  0.089  0.086 
Residual  0.547  0.512  0.507 
Total  1.000  1.000  1.000 
*Following the method developed in Fields [2004]. 
 
More generally, the relative contribution of differentiated governance variables to 
explaining investment-rate changes is detailed in Table 3, which breaks down the 
contribution of each variable to the explanatory power of Equations 2, 5, and 6 (following 
Fields [2004]), with the total totalling unity, including the unexplained residual. Without 
accounting for development levels, governance variables contribute about 6 percent to 
explaining the variation of changing investment levels (Column 1). A consideration of 
                                                 
14 These mean squared errors (MSEs) are computed only for predictions for included Asian countries and are 
distinct from the global-sample MSEs reported in Tables 2.1 and 2.2.  
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development levels, however, raises the contribution to almost 9 percent, It may be said 
therefore that differentiating countries by development levels raises by 50 percent the 
capacity of governance variables to explain investment-rate changes. The table also 
provides a sense of the significance of changing governance. Changing governance 
certainly cannot claim exclusively, nor even primarily, to explain the bulk of the changes 
in global investment ratios. The most important variable appears to be the momentum of 
previous investment. Governance variables, on the other hand, account for as much as 17-
18 percent
15 of the total variation explained by the best specifications and trump the 
contributions of changing per capita GDP, economic openness, and the Asian Crisis itself.  
 
Relevance for Asia 
 
Beyond statistical fit, the more important gain is the increase and differentiation in the 
number of significant variables and their potentially richer implications for theory and 
policy. To assess the relevance of these results for Asia, we classify countries according to 
per-capita income quartiles and then examine to what extent changes in the salient 
governance-variables relate to changes in investment (Table 4). The countries of specific 
interest in this volume happen to be neatly distributed, with India and Vietnam in the first 
quartile; China and Indonesia in the second, and Malaysia and Thailand in the third. By 
2007, however, India and Vietnam had transited from the first to the second quartile, while 
China leapt from the second to the third quartile to join Malaysia and Thailand. 
Effectively, therefore, by the end of the period under consideration, all six Asian countries 
were in the second or third quartiles. 
  
Table 4. Asia and the Pacific countries by real per capita GDP quartile (1992-1996) 
Q1  Q2  Q3  Q4 
Afghanistan   China  China (2007)  Australia  
Bangladesh   Fiji   Marshall Islands   Brunei Darussalam  
Bhutan   Micronesia, Fed. Sts.   Malaysia   Hong Kong, China  
India   India (2007)  Thailand   Japan  
Cambodia   Indonesia   Tonga  Korea, Rep.  
Kiribati   Sri Lanka     Macao, China  
Lao PDR   Maldives      New Zealand  
Mongolia   Pakistan      Palau  
Nepal   Philippines      Singapore  
Solomon Islands   Papua New Guinea      Taipei, China 
Vietnam  Vietnam (2007)     
  Samoa      
  Vanuatu       
Salient variables        
Rule of law  
[Control of corruption] 
Voice and accountability  
Regulatory quality 
Regulatory quality  
Control of corruption 
Regulatory quality 
 
Note: Quartiles based on all countries that have data on real per capita GDP in the Penn World Table 
 
Among Q1-countries during the period, Vietnam, along with Mongolia and Bangladesh, 
was an obvious example that conformed to the predicted average pattern, with investment 
rising with the rule-of-law measure. In the said countries, even the incidental slippage in 
the control of corruption is in line with the trend. India, on the other hand, showed a 
deteriorating performance in terms of the rule of law (which may itself have been 
                                                 
15 Referring to the last three rows of Table 3, that is 0.089/(1 – 0.512) and 0.086/(1 – 0.507), respectively.  
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associated with laxer control of corruption), but nonetheless showed a markedly higher 
investment rate. 
 
Among Q2-countries, the results predict that improvements in voice and accountability 
and in regulatory quality should matter on average. In China‟s case, the perceived fall in 
regulatory quality during the period appeared not to have a negative effect, although 
improving voice and accountability contributed positively. Indonesia, on the other hand, 
showed a marked improvement in voice-and-accountability measures, obviously reflecting 
the regime-change to a more functional elective democracy since 1999 after three decades 
of Suharto‟s New Order. The improved investment ratio is consistent with this change, but 
this has occurred despite a significant deterioration in regulatory quality. As for other 
countries in this group, Pakistan, the Philippines, and Fiji, run true to predicted form on all 
counts, so that in these cases, deteriorating governance is augmented other factors to cause 
falling investment ratios. 
 
The two countries of interest in Q3, Malaysia and Thailand, both showed a deterioration in 
the two salient dimensions – control of corruption and regulatory quality – so that 
institutional and governance factors seem to contribute to an explanation of declining 
investment performance. The above also suggests that rapid performers such as China, 
Vietnam, and India, which have since crossed categories during the period may soon 
confront new constraints, for which they may be more or less adapted. In China‟s case, for 
example, new circumstances may compel it to confront problems of corruption more 
aggressively
16, while Vietnam and India are obviously differently situated in their ability 
to respond to possible concerns for regulatory quality and voice and accountability, where 
these are applicable. 
 
The need for closer country historical studies 
 
The above considerations based on average global relationships are significant, but it is 
important to emphasize that at the level of individual countries, these are suggestive at 
best, and it remains to be seen whether the principal factors suggested by this empirical 
analysis find confirmation in the experience of a specific country. While we are in no 
doubt that this framework is helpful guide, there should be no illusion it can substitute for 
in-depth and historical approaches to individual countries‟ conditions.
17 It should be 
particularly noted that (a) there is no claim that institutional factors alone are responsible 
for changes in a country‟s investment performance, although it has been shown to be a 
significant factor that must be considered. Our own position is that “institutions matter at 
some point” rather than that “institutions rule” without qualification. (b) In the same vein, 
however, a country may progress from or regress into one development category to 
another without necessarily having resolved all institutional issues of a previous stage – 
some of which may come back to bite it. This can be seen from significant (albeit non-
Asian) examples of Middle East countries caught up in the so-called “Arab Spring”. Given 
the fairly levels of per-capita income of such countries
18, one might have expected them to 
                                                 
16 Indeed, the authorities may already have become sensitised to this, given central measures recently 
announced which are designed to strengthen the government‟s corruption efforts. 
17 In the study one of us undertook of the Philippines, for example, while the country‟s categorisation 
suggests that voice and accountability and regulatory quality may be the relevant factors, a closer look 
indicates that corruption and political instability may have been the historically significant deterrents to 
investment [de Dios 2009]. 
18 Egypt and Tunisia are in Q3 while Libya is in Q4.  
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have been pre-occupied by “higher order” governance issues such as regulatory quality 
and control of corruption, just like the Asian countries covered here. Recent events, 
however, make it evident that more fundamental “first-order” issues pertaining to 
democracy and accountability remained unresolved in those countries, with the process of 
their resolution leading to radical regime-changes that threaten political stability and the 
rule of law.  
 
Keeping this in mind, it is notable that on the whole, most governance issues relevant to 
the Asian countries studied in this volume now pertain – subject to important 
qualifications discussed further below – only to the two broad issues of regulatory quality 
and control of corruption. This is so, since India and Vietnam have since transited into Q2, 
while China has moved into Q3. Table 5 provides the values of the World Governance 
Indicators for the relevant countries.  
 
Table 5. Some governance indicators for selected countries 
(2007; figures in parentheses refer to percentile rankings)  








China  -0.45 (41.0)  -1.72  ( 4.8)  -0.60 (33.8)  -0.18 (49.5) 
India  +0.14 (56.7)  +0.47 (60.2)  -0.37 (44.4)  -0.21 (47.1) 
Indonesia  -0.64 (30.0)  -0.15 (43.3)  -0.60 (33.3)  -0.25 (44.2) 
Malaysia  +0.57 (65.2)  -0.57 (32.2)  +0.35 (67.6)  +0.57 (67.5) 
Thailand  -0.02 (53.3)  -0.61 (30.3)  -0.29 (48.3)  +0.16 (57.3) 
Vietnam  -0.41 (43.9)  -1.60  ( 7.2)  -0.61 (32.4)  -0.43 (35.4) 
Source: Kaufmann, Kraay and Mastruzzi accessed from: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp 
 
In one sense, the countries in question appear to have “passed over” or “outgrown” most 
of the “first-order” governance issues that typically afflict poorer or failing states, 
especially problems related to the maintenance of order, basic contract enforcement, and 
the maintenance of regime legitimacy and stability. An issue such as regulatory quality is, 
after all, ultimately a “higher-order” issue relating to the direction of policy rather than the 
capacity to formulate and implement policy itself. These include such issues as nationality 
restrictions, trade policies, industrial priorities and incentives, and financial regulations, 
which Kaufmann et al. [2008] sum these up as “sound policies and regulations that permit 
and promote private sector development”. Likewise, that corruption issues should become 
prominent already presupposes that broad and formally impartial laws and rules are in 
place and a civil society or business community exists that expects such rules to be 
adhered to begin with. The saliency of the problem itself reflects the inadequacy or failure 
of informal institutions and modes of relational contracting to resolve transactional issues 
relating to business. 
 
These issues are evident in the experiences many some individual countries. In Malaysia, 
for example, a major regulatory issue affecting investment has been the continuation of 
the preferential ethnic ownership quotas for large enterprises under the nation‟s long-
standing bumiputra policy. It has been pointed out, among others by Hill [2010], that this 
policy has an obvious disincentive effect for non-Malays (particularly ethnic Chinese) to 
expand their businesses. It imposes a real penalty for entrepreneurs in so-called “Ali 
Baba” accommodations
19, as well as reinforces the continuation of the large role of 
                                                 
19 That is, arrangements in which Malays, in exchange for fees or directorships, front as majority 
shareholders for non-Malays to fulfill ethnic requirements and gain access to contracts.  
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government-linked companies in the economy, which have been important vehicles of 
patronage. While the ethnic quota pre-dates the Asian crisis, its deleterious effects on 
investment may have been exacerbated in the period of lower global growth. Moreover, 
the very uncertainty of the continuation of that policy – with the prime minister himself 
moving towards its reconsideration and given the ruling party‟s weakening political hold 
on power – may paradoxically contribute to the observed investment decline. The same 
post-crisis political weakening of the dominant UMNO party may lead to shorter horizons 




The institutional factors affecting Thailand‟s recent economic performance are admittedly 
more complex than the scheme laid out above. A short discussion of it is still instructive, 
nonetheless, if only to prove the point that unresolved institutional issues may yet return to 
haunt a country. The average model predicts that for its level of income, Thailand should 
have “outgrown” questions of regime legitimacy and accountability. Yet it is evident that 
part of the dramatic deterioration in the Thai economy‟s investment performance must 
owe to the uncertainty
21 wrought by deep and unresolved political divisions that have 
persisted since 2005 and which have resulted in nullified elections, actual or threatened 
coups d’etat, violent mass demonstrations and their equally violent suppression – in short, 
concerns of regime legitimacy and accountability more typical of a Q2 country. This 
strongly suggests, in the language of North et al. [2009], a failure among the country‟s 
elites (civilian politicians, the military, and monarchic circles) to agree on the process for 
a normal succession and sharing of power, but it also points to the deeper problem of 
social cohesion and the wide gulf between the urban middle classes and the rural 
population, which past economic growth has failed to bridge.  
 
In this sense, Indonesia provides a contemporary contrast in that it continues to ride the 
wave of its having resolved legitimacy and accountability questions following the Asian 
crisis, an issue conformable to its level of development. (The decline in Indonesia‟s post-
crisis investment rate is notably far less than that of Thailand.) It must be remembered, of 
course, that the current stability has been purchased at the cost of dealing with serious 
ethnic violence and separatist challenges in the period during and immediately after the 
Asian financial crisis. In the event, the successful operation of regular electoral processes 
and the meeting of regional demands with greater local autonomy (or, in the extreme, 
independence as in the case of Timor Leste) of some provinces have for now resolved 
questions of stability, legitimacy, and accountability and prevented these factors from 
interfering with the recovery of accumulation rates.  
 
In the meantime, a growing concern with corruption has pervaded most countries 
considered in this study, but most notably China, Indonesia, and India. China‟s prime 
minister
22 has been quoted as saying that “corruption is the greatest threat to China”. 
Official media has also been more forthcoming regarding the existence and scale of 
corruption, reporting for example on recent crackdowns on corrupt officials and almost 
casually mentioning a remarkable Ministry of Commerce estimate that more than US$30 
billion has been illicitly taken overseas by some 4,000 corrupt officials over three 
decades.
23 It is difficult to judge the seriousness of such pronouncements and whether they 
                                                 
20 We thank participants of the ADB workshop for pointing this out.  
21 See also the paper by B. Nidiprabha in this collection. 
22 Wen Jiabao at the National People‟s Congress on 3 March 2011. 
23 See Xinhua (China Daily) at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-02/26/content_9506256.htm.  
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will ultimately lead to effective action; nor is corruption by any means a novel 
phenomenon. The government‟s express concern and greater official media frankness 
about the issue at this time, however, demonstrates its anticipation of a next-generation 
problem that resonates with a more sensitive civil society and a more demanding domestic 
and foreign business community. It is incidentally also in line with the simple sequence 
outlined here (i.e., China‟s rapid transit from Q2 to Q3). By portraying corruption as a 
serious issue that could “destabilise social stability”
24, the government there is clearly 
aware of the possibility that the issue might otherwise spill over into questions of regime 
legitimacy. The government, therefore, implicitly believes that addressing the corruption 
issue is a vital factor – and indeed possibly a substitute – for the other salient Q2 variable – 
namely, voice and accountability, where China‟s low indicator placed it in the 4.8 
percentile of countries in 2007 (Table 5). In particular, that the demand for pluralism, 
democratic processes, and civil liberties might be staved off – at least in the short-term – 
by a prompt response to the corruption issue and improved regulatory quality. At the very 
least, however, this is an untested theory, and it remains to be seen whether a substitution 
in historical practice is possible between mechanisms of social accountability even at 
higher levels of economic development – i.e., as between traditional institutions of liberal 
democracy, on the one hand, and the ability of a massive state bureaucracy to reform itself 
from within, on the other, or even whether a gradual transition from one to the other is 
possible. (For a pessimistic outlook, see Pei [2007].)  
 
Not in the near term but in the future, such considerations are also likely to confront 
Vietnam, which shares the same features of party- and state-dominated economic 
decision-making as China. Vietnam actually ranks slightly worse (44
th percentile) in terms 
of corruption than China (34
th percentile, Table 5).  The reason the corruption has not 
become more urgent in Vietnam – as follows from our framework – lies in the two 
countries‟ differing economic levels: the large number of various exploitable market 
opportunities and untapped resources at several levels allows sufficient returns to be 
earned by both large and small economic actors even in the presence of corruption. It may 
be anticipated, however, that – as in China – once the scale and sophistication of 
transactions reaches a certain level, margins will no longer be as generous as to 
accommodate grand corruption by officials. Especially relevant is a specific characteristic 
of recent Vietnamese growth, which is its high dependence on foreign saving and foreign 
capital
25, as contrasted with China‟s primary reliance on home investment. This means, 
among other things, that Vietnam is likely to confront a tougher and more fickle (because 
foreign) audience when the need to make palpable headway against corruption finally 
becomes urgent. In the short term, however, the lure of unused resources and a tolerable 
rule-of-law environment may be sufficient to sustain the rapid pace of investment in that 
country. 
 
The significance of corruption in the other countries treated here is also unlikely to be as 
potentially dramatic as in China (or Vietnam‟s in the future). While media and politicians 
have also reflected the serious public concern over corruption in India and Indonesia, for 
example, this far less likely to spill over into questions of regime legitimacy for the future 
– although it might matter for the fate of particular governments. This is because unlike 
                                                 
24 Wen Jiabao on 25 March 2011. On this, see http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/china/2011-
03/25/c_13798577.htm 
25 Vietnamese growth has been based on perennial current-account deficits, which have been largely offset 
by foreign direct investments. Total investment in Vietnam is foreign-owned by as much as 25-30 percent. 
(See the paper by Pham Lan Huong in this collection.)  
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China, India and Indonesia already have existing political processes that allow for the 
orderly change of ruling elites (e.g., as a rough indicator India and Indonesia were in the 
60
th and 40
th percentiles of the voice-and-accountability index, as against China, which 
was in the 5
th percentile, or Vietnam which is in the 7
th percentile).  
 
This country-by-country discussion largely illustrates our point: that the importance of 
various governance factors will manifest at different times depending on a country‟s level 
of development. Even this treatment, however, is suggestive at best, although we believe it 
represents a systematic improvement over other discussions of institutional factors that 
generally tend to be ad hoc and impressionistic. Further work can be undertaken to refine 
the relevant concept “development level” (we have only used the crudest form, which is a 
grouping according to per-capita income) as well as its empirical specification. More 
importantly, there can be no substitute for in-depth single-country studies through time in 




We have advanced the hypothesis – straightforward but apparently novel in the formal 
literature – that the specific governance factors affecting a country‟s economic 
performance (here, taken to mean investment) hinge on its level of development. This idea 
has been tested empirically, and the results of that test have been themselves been 
examined against the specific situations of selected Asian countries.  
 
On the whole, we conclude that governance and institutional factors do exert an influence 
on investment in Asia and that they form part of the explanation of the observed 
investment behaviour in the region. Governance factors such as the rule of law, the control 
of corruption, and the regulatory quality have been identified as being particularly 
relevant. Countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Thailand have manifested lower 
investment ratios partly owing to the purely economic consequences of the Asian crisis, 
but also because of the changed relevance of existing institutions that that crisis has 
provoked. Changes in political institutions and practices have been adequate to clear the 
way for an eventual rebound of investment rates in some cases – but less so in others. 
Even countries such as China, Vietnam, and India, which have not experienced an 
investment slowdown during the period, however, will need to worry about taking the next 
appropriate steps to reform aspects of governance relevant to their histories and levels of 
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